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Abstract
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is considered a critical technology needed to
curb CO2 emissions and is envisioned by the International Energy Agency (IEA)
as an integral part of least-cost greenhouse gas mitigation policy. In this paper,
we assess the extent to which CCS and R&D in CCS technology are indeed part of
a socially efficient solution to the problem of climate change. For this purpose, we
extend the intertemporal model of climate and directed technical change developed
by Acemoglu et al. (2012, American Economic Review, 102(1): 131–66) to include
a sector responsible for CCS. Surprisingly, even for an optimistic cost estimate
available for CCS ($60/ton of CO2 avoided), we find that it is not optimal to deploy
CCS or devote resources to R&D in CCS technology either in the near or distant
future. Indeed, it is only when the marginal cost of CCS is less than $12/ton that
a scenario with an active CCS sector (including R&D) becomes optimal, though
not in the near future.
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1 Introduction
In 2010, fossil fuels represented more than 80% of global energy use1 and are responsible
for 65% of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (IEA, 2011, pp. 18–
19). Although renewables have significant potential in energy production, fossil fuels will
remain the dominant source of energy for decades to come.2 Without specific actions,
atmospheric CO2 concentration will continue to grow and this may prove disastrous for
future generations (UNEP, 2006).
Three main policies have been proposed as possible solutions to the problem of climate
change: the more intensive use of renewable and nuclear energy; the more efficient
generation of power and end-use of energy carriers; and the development and deployment
of technologies to capture and store carbon emissions from fossil fuel use.3 Carbon
capture and storage (CCS) technology can be used by large stationary point sources
such as fossil fuel-fired power plants and emission-intensive industrial facilities. Its
main purpose is to prevent CO2 emissions from entering the atmosphere. The rates
of carbon captured can be as high as 85–95%, in both the pre- and post-combustion
systems.4
The development of CCS technologies has been advocated by both individual coun-
tries and international organizations. For example, some high-income oil- and gas-
producing countries in Europe and North America are strongly committed to the use
of resources in the research, development and demonstration (RD&D) of CCS technolo-
gies. Using cross-sectional analysis of OECD countries, Tjernshaugen (2008) finds that
1Fossil fuels, renewables, and nuclear electric power respectively account for 83%, 8.3%, and 8.7% of
total global energy use (EIA, 2011a, Table 1.1).
2According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, fossil fuels will account for 78% of world
energy use in 2035 (EIA, 2011b).
3A fourth possible policy solution entering recent debate is geoengineering, the intentional, large-
scale manipulation of the earth’s climate system. See Rasch et al. (2008), Cicerone (2006), and Barrett
(2008).
4There are three methods for capturing CO2. Post-combustion carbon capture removes carbon after
combustion. Here, CO2 is separated from the flue gases (whose main constituent is nitrogen) using a
liquid solvent. In pre-combustion carbon capture, fuel is pretreated and converted into a mix of CO2 and
hydrogen. The hydrogen is then separated from the carbon before being burned to produce electricity.
In the oxy-fuel combustion process, the fuel is burned using oxygen rather than air. The result is a flue
stream of CO2 and water vapour. Because no nitrogen is present, CO2 can be easily removed (Golombek
et al., 2011; Metz et al., 2005).
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fossil fuel reserves and extraction activities are the main variables explaining funding
levels for RD&D on CCS. Outstanding examples are Canada and Norway.5 To give
an idea of the orders of magnitude, Tjernshaugen (2008) reports that for these countries
the 2005 RD&D budget for CCS normalized by 2002 total government energy-related
RD&D expenditures amounted to 6.2% and 38.8% of the total, respectively. The share
of Norwegian CCS RD&D clearly stands out and one may wonder why such a relatively
small country is so concerned with CCS technology, for which we can offer two reasons.
First, with hydropower being historically the main energy carrier in Norway, power gen-
eration from fossil fuels was almost absent. When gas-fired power plants were added to
the Norwegian energy grid, compliance with domestic emissions targets especially was
required, thereby promoting the interest in CSS technology and its potential. The sec-
ond reason is the large contribution of the oil and gas extraction industry to Norway’s
GDP. The only way to reconcile a strong commitment to environmental policies alongside
Norway being a large exporter of fossil fuels is by producing and making available the
know-how to prevent the CO2 generated by burning fossil fuels entering the environment
(Tjernshaugen, 2011).
Several international and intergovernmental agencies, including the International En-
ergy Agency (IEA), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IIPC), and the
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), also envision an important role for CCS
as part of an environmentally sustainable global energy policy, and therefore point to
the need for significant R&D efforts today in order to endow the world with an economic
carbon capturing and storage technology. For example, in IPCC (2005, p. 12), CCS
is shown to have the potential to provide 15% to 55% of the world’s cumulative GHG
mitigation efforts up to 2100. Further, to bring down GHG emissions to 50% of their
2005 level by 2050, IEA (2008) shows that about 27% of the reductions should come
from the extensive use of renewables and nuclear energy, 54% from efficiency enhance-
ment, and 19% from CCS activities. Without access to CCS technology, the same
report estimates that the overall cost to achieve these emission reductions increases by
70%. In another report, IEA (2009) sketches a road map for CCS and shows that the
technology is required to grow from a handful of existing large-scale projects today to
5In Norway, Technology Centre Mongstad is the world’s largest facility for testing and improving
CO2 capture technologies. In Canada, the Boundary Dam Integrated CCS project is planned to be
completed and able to commence the capture and storage of carbon by November, 2013.
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around 3,000 projects by 2050, to secure the above-mentioned 19% share in emission
reductions. However, it is worth noting that CCS is not considered as the only pol-
icy for establishing an environmentally sustainable growth path, as the development of
renewable energy sources are also given a prominent role.6 Thus, it appears that the
recommended mitigation portfolio is a very balanced one.
Without doubt, these studies have been very useful in informing both policymakers
and the general public about the available options and costs involved when directing
emissions to a more sustainable trajectory. At the same time, the welfare economic
trade-offs underlying the results are not always transparent, i.e., it is not always clear
to what extent differences in scenarios are the result of differences in the constraints
imposed (emission caps, technological, and economic constraints) or the differences in
trade-offs for which the models allow (e.g., between economic growth and environmental
quality).
In this paper, we wish to assess the scope for CCS and CCS R&D as part of a
socially efficient solution to the climate change problem. The vehicle that we use for this
purpose is the intertemporal model of climate and directed technical change developed
by Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn and Hemous (2012, AABH hereafter). In this model,
final good production requires two inputs, renewable and fossil fuel energy. Both types
of energy are produced using labour and capital (and a finite stock of non-renewable
fossil fuels) with the help of the latest available technologies. These technologies result
from costly R&D efforts, and given a finite number of scientists, faster technological
progress in one sector needs to be balanced against slower progress in the other sector.
The production of fossil fuel energy increases the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere, and
therefore contributes to a global increase in temperature. This global warming in turn
reduces the quality of the environment and with it the welfare of the representative
consumer.
6IPCC (2012) reports on 164 commissioned medium- and long-term scenarios from 16 global energy–
economic and integrated assessment models. The scenarios range from baseline simulations with CO2
atmospheric concentrations as high as 1050 ppm by 2100 to those with CO2 caps as tight as 350 ppm by
2100. The results show that the share of renewable energy varies from today’s share of 17% to shares as
high as 77% in 2050. But even in some of the baseline scenarios with no CO2 caps imposed, renewable
energy shares can be much higher than those currently, reflecting significant differences regarding the
assumptions on the evolution of the energy and abatement technologies (including CCS), energy demand,
and prospective fossil fuel availability.
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To this model, we append a new sector, that for CCS, which also operates using
labour and capital. Like both energy sectors, the CCS technology may be improved by
devoting resources to R&D. We calibrate our model using both recent data on world
energy production levels and recent estimates of the marginal cost of CCS. We then ask
ourselves the following questions: (i) is it socially optimal to include CCS in today’s
or the near future’s mitigation portfolio?; and (ii) is it socially optimal to devote R&D
resources to improve CCS technology, such that it becomes part of an optimal mitigation
policy in the more distant future? We find that given today’s marginal costs of CCS
and clean and dirty energy production, the answer to both questions is rather bleak. We
then ask by how much the marginal cost of CCS needs to fall such that both CCS and
R&D into the CCS technology become socially optimal. Worryingly, we find that the
decrease in the cost of CCS must be quite large, at least 80% of the level today.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 details the model. In Section 4, we provide the details about the
numerical implementation. Section 5 presents the results given the cost estimates for
CCS. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
In recent years, a literature has developed that studies the desirability of CCS as part
of the first-best or second-best environmental policy portfolio used in combating climate
change. This literature has developed in several directions: partial vs general equilib-
rium models, theoretical models vs numerical solutions to empirically calibrated models,
models encompassing exogenous vs endogenous technical progress.
An early contribution to this literature is by Goulder and Mathai (2000) who develop
a partial equilibrium model to answer the question about how the endogenization of
technological progress affects the optimal trajectories for abatement activity and carbon
taxes. They show both analytically and through numerical simulations that endogenous
technical progress with respect to (w.r.t) abatement activity (what they term “induced
technical change” or the possibility of reducing the cost of abatement through devoting
resources to R&D) in general lowers the time profile of optimal carbon taxes, and shifts
at least some abatement activity from the present to the future.
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However, the more recent literature has often taken a general equilibrium approach.
We can discern at least two separate strands in this literature. One is concerned with
the characterization of socially efficient environmental policy, and its implementation in
a decentralized economy, possibly under some second-best policy restrictions (such as
upper bounds on the tax rate set on carbon emissions). Examples include Grimaud
and Rouge (2012) and Le Kama et al. (2013). The other strand compares the welfare
costs of different (portfolios of) policy instruments when CO2 stabilization or maximum
temperature change targets are imposed. Examples include Gerlagh and van der Zwaan
(2006), Grimaud et al. (2011), and Kalkuhl et al. (2012).
Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2006) use a top-down computable general equilibrium
model with an environment module to which they append a CCS sector. Technical
progress in this sector stems from learning-by-doing. Assuming a marginal cost of
abatement of 45$/ton CO2 avoided, they compute the carbon emission trajectories for
30 five-year periods (2000–2150) under five stabilization targets (ranging from 450 to 550
ppm–particles per million) and five policy scenarios in addition to a business-as-usual
scenario. Their results reveal that irrespective of the stabilization target, subsidization
of renewable energy use is the most expensive policy, while a carbon emission tax in
which revenue is recycled as a subsidy for non-fossil energy use represents the least
costly policy mix. A carbon tax also dominates policy that charges for fossil fuel use
because it incentivizes the use of CCS activity. While CCS activity is low to begin with,
about 30–50% of new fossil-fuel capacity from 2050 onwards is complemented with CCS
equipment.
Grimaud et al. (2011) extend the Goulder and Mathai (2000) framework to a general
equilibrium setting. They model a decentralized market economy where energy, capital,
and labour are combined into a final good. Energy is produced from non-renewable
fuels and a renewable energy source. Growth is endogenous and depends on R&D
investments used to promote the efficiency of use of energy in final good production,
the efficiency of producing renewable energy, or the efficiency of CCS in reducing the
emissions resulting from the use of fossil fuels. In this market economy, investors are able
to capture only a fraction of R&D returns and this motivates the use of (differentiated)
R&D subsidies. Assuming a cap on atmospheric carbon concentration (450 or 550
ppm), they then provide a general characterization of the second-best trajectory for the
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tax on carbon emissions and the three R&D subsidies that maximize social welfare. In
particular, the carbon tax is shown to follow an inverted U-shaped trajectory. Their
main finding is that both tax and subsidy instruments should be used simultaneously to
provide the strongest impact, and that R&D in CCS is warranted in the medium term
only if accompanied by the imposition of a ceiling on the stock of atmospheric CO2.
Grimaud and Rouge (2012) also adopt a general equilibrium approach. In their
model, endogenous growth is restricted to the final goods industry. Final output makes
use of intermediate goods (embodying technology), labour, and the extracted amounts
of a non-renewable energy resource. The use of energy in production causes emissions
that can be abated (i.e., captured and stored) using labour. With a constant and in-
elastic labour supply, the main trade-off in their model is between output production
and abatement. The authors first characterize the socially optimal trajectories with and
without access to a CCS technology, and then trace out the paths for a decentralized
economy when only second-best policy tools are available. They find that the greatest
abatement effort should take place in the near future, and thereafter gradually decline
over time. Moreover, compared with an economy without CCS technology, the avail-
ability of CCS speeds up the optimal extraction rate and lowers output growth as labour
is diverted from R&D activities.
Finally, in a static multi-market general equilibrium model for Europe, Golombek
et al. (2011) look at the development of CCS in relation to technology-neutral abatement
policies (i.e., carbon taxes or tradable permits)7. When an uniform tax of 90$/tCO2 is
implemented, the results show that new coal power plants with CCS become profitable
and replace non-CCS coal power investments and a large share new wind power. For the
same tax level, new gas power plants with CCS become profitable and replace almost all
non-CCS power investments. Compared to a BAU scenario, this leads to a 90% lower
CO2 emissions in 2030. The results also imply that from a social point of view it is not
desirable to retrofit CCS into the existing coal and gas power plants.
Our model shares several aspects with the models described. We employ a global and
dynamic general equilibrium setting with four sectors: a “dirty” fossil fuel energy sector,
a “clean” renewable energy sector, a CCS sector, and a sector transforming clean and
7Equilibrium is calculated for exogenously taken non-EU parameter values.
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dirty energy into a final good that is used for consumption and capital investment. In
addition to the standard labour balance constraint, the economy is endowed with a stock
of scientists who can be allocated to each of the three lower-level sectors (clean, dirty,
and CCS) where their efforts result in efficiency-enhancing innovations. Moreover, rather
than imposing exogenous stabilization targets, we let the quality of the environment enter
consumer welfare (cf. Smulders and Gradus (1996) and Grimaud and Rouge (2012)).
In this regard, we are primarily interested in whether CCS activity and CCS-related
R&D effort are part of a first-best policy. We characterize the socially optimal solution,
proceed by a numerical calibration of our model in the same vein as AABH, and then
optimize as in Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2006) over a finite but long discrete horizon
(thirty 10-year periods). Unlike the models reviewed above, we find little scope for
(R&D on) CCS.
3 The model
We specify a four-sector general equilibrium model, which augments the three-sector
model in AABH with a fourth sector responsible for CCS activity. As we are primarily
interested in socially optimal policy, we discard any issues related to the implementation
of this policy in a market economy through taxes and the subsidization of R&D activities.
The interested reader is referred to the AABH article.8
An infinitely lived representative consumer cares about a final good (ct) and the
quality of the environment (Ft) in each period t of life. The period utility function,
U(ct, Ft), satisfies the standard monotonicity and concavity assumptions. The final
good is produced by means of two energy carriers: dirty energy (Ydt) and clean energy
(Yct). The (symmetric) production function is assumed to display a constant elasticity
8See Greaker and Heggedal (2012) for a discussion of the robustness of R&D subsidy policies pre-
scribed by the AABH model w.r.t. the assumptions on the length of the patent period.
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of substitution (CES), ε:9
Yt =
(
Y
−1

ct + Y
−1

dt
) 
−1
. (1)
Each of the two energy types j (j = c, d) is produced using labour (Lj), of which
there is a unit mass available in each period, and capital (xj), which is available at
constant marginal cost ψ. The sector production functions are of Cobb–Douglas form,
with technology parameter (sectoral stock of knowledge) Aj (j = c, d). The same is
true for the CCS sector, which we label with index a (for abatement). Thus:
Yjt = A
1−α
jt L
1−α
jt x
α
jt (j = a, c, d). (2)
The stock of knowledge/technology level Ajt in sector j is assumed to grow at a rate
of γηjsjt, where sj is the number of researchers allocated to sector j (j = a, c, d), ηj is
the probability that a single researcher is successful in creating an innovation, and γ is
the relative increase in knowledge in the case of such an innovation.10 Subsequently, Aj
evolves according to:
Ajt = (1 + γηjsjt)Ajt−1. (3)
There is a unit mass of scientists available in each period and the allocation of a scientist
to one sector fully crowds out R&D activity in the other sector/s.11
9For a discussion regarding the CES function and the value of the elasticity of substitution between
the two energy carriers, we refer the reader to Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2004). Below, we will follow
these authors’ suggestion of 3 as a central value for ε. This value implies that the isoquants are tangent
with the input axes, but at the same time have endpoints at y
3
2 . Thus, although the CES specification
makes it technically feasible to rely solely on renewable energy, such a solution will not be selected as
long as the (social) relative price of fossil fuel energy is finite. Alternatively, one could have recourse
to a Variable Elasticity of Substitution specification, as in Gerlagh and Lise (2005). The advantage of
such specification is that the substitution eleasticity between the two energy carriers falls to 1 if one
carrier becomes dominant.
10Thus, there are constant returns to scale in research. However, arguments also exist that may
provide deviations from this in both directions. For instance, “fishing out” problems, where easy
inventions occur sooner with little effort whereas larger technological challenges are solved later and
require more effort, infer decreasing returns to scale, while positive spillovers between researchers and/or
labs suggest increasing returns to scale. See Mattauch et al. (2012) for a variant of the AABH model
with technical progress stemming from learning-by-doing.
11Roucade et al. (2011) drop the assumption that the pool of scientists differs from the pool of
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With an activity level Ya in the CCS sector, the emissions corresponding to Ya units of
dirty energy input production are captured and stored. The carbon sink (environmental
stock) therefore evolves according to the following equation of motion:
St = −ξ(Ydt−1 − Yat−1) + (1 + δ)St−1, (4)
where ξ is the rate of CO2 emissions from dirty energy production and δ is the regenera-
tion rate of the environment. The size of the carbon sink translates into an environmental
quality index F˜ (St) (see p. 15).
As we are primarily interested in optimal policy, we consider the levels of the labour
and capital inputs, the level of energy production, the level of CCS activity, and the
allocation of scientists that maximize the intertemporal utility of the representative con-
sumer subject to the technology constraints, the equation of motion for the environment
and for the sectoral stocks of knowledge, and the balance constraints for labour and
scientists.
max
{Yt,Yjt,,Ljt,xjt,sjt}j=c,d,at=0...∞
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Yt − ψ(xct + xdt + xat), F˜ (St))
s.t Yt =
(
Y
−1

ct + Y
−1

dt
) 
−1
(λt)
Yjt = A
1−α
jt L
1−α
jt x
α
jt (λjt) (j = a, c, d)
Ajt = (1 + γηjsjt)Ajt−1 (µjt) (j = a, c, d)
St = −ξ(Ydt−1 − Yat−1) + (1 + δ)St−1 (ωt)
1 ≥ Lct + Ldt + Lat (wt)
1 ≥ sct + sdt + sat (σt)
Yat ≤ Ydt (φt) .
In this problem, β is the discount factor, ψ is the amount of final goods necessary to
build a machine, and the Lagrange multipliers in brackets following the constraints are
all current values (thus the net present value of a marginal unit of labour in period t is
workers.
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βtwt). The final inequality precludes the more than 100% capture of CO2 emissions (we
ignore the fact that existing CCS technology does not allow for capture rates exceeding
approximately 90%). In a market economy, these decisions can be decentralized by means
of a tax on the dirty energy input production, subsidies to research on clean energy
production and CCS technology, subsidies to machine use (to correct for the market
power of machine producers), and lump-sum transfers to the representative consumer.
In the sequel, we define the social price of sector j output as p̂jt
def
=
λjt
λt
(j = c, d, a),
and the ad valorem rate on fossil fuel energy use as τt
def
= βξ ωt+1
λdt
. The latter is the social
marginal environmental damage of period t emissions βξ ωt+1
λt
, expressed as a fraction of
the social price of dirty energy, p̂dt. Here, ωt+1, the shadow value of the environment at
time t + 1, is the discounted intertemporal sum of marginal disutilities caused by the
current dirty input production, which is adjusted for the value of the dirty input and
regeneration in every period:
ωt =
∞∑
k=0
βk(1 + δ)kUskF˜
′
k.
In the remainder of this section, we focus on characterizing the optimal policy w.r.t.
the CCS sector, in both its level of activity and the efforts directed to R&D. We relegate
to the Appendix the solution to the full model.
For both energy carriers, the marginal product in final good production should equal
the social price: MPct = p̂ct and MPdt = (1 + τt)p̂dt. For abatement activity (i.e., CCS),
the optimality condition is:
p̂at ≥ τtp̂dt − φt
λt
,
with equality whenever Yat > 0. The second term on the right-hand side (RHS) is the
period t social cost of not being able to capture more CO2 than the amount emitted
by the dirty sector in period t; this cost is obviously zero when Yat < Ydt. Thus,
when p̂at > τtp̂dt, any abatement is suboptimal. If partial abatement is optimal, then
p̂at = τtp̂dt, while full abatement requires that p̂at ≤ τtp̂dt.
In the Appendix, we show that allocating a scientist to the R&D department of sector
11
j yields a marginal social value of:
µjt
λt
γηjAjt−1 =
1
λt
γηj
1 + γηjsjt
(1− α)
∞∑
τ=0
βτλt+τ p̂jt+τYjt+τ . (5)
This value positively depends on (i) the productivity of R&D (γηj) and (ii) the discounted
social value of the output stream (p̂jt+τYjt+τ , τ = 0...∞) of sector j. If the R&D in
sector j is optimal, then this marginal social value should match the social wage of
the scientists, vt
λt
. If (5) falls short of vt
λt
, then R&D is not optimal in sector j. It is
therefore clear from (5) that substantial CO2 capture and storage in the near future is
a prerequisite for justifying R&D in the CCS sector.12
The allocation of labour and capital across sectors should satisfy the standard condi-
tions of equality between the marginal products and the corresponding social prices. In
the Appendix, we show how the first-order conditions together with the constraints allow
us to reduce the above maximization problem to a simpler model in terms of four sets of
decision variables: {Yat, τt, sct, sdt}t=0...∞, subject to the maximum abatement constraints
(φt). This problem is then calibrated and solved (with MATLAB) for a large but finite
time horizon. In the next section, we explain the calibration. The optimal solutions
are presented and discussed in Section 5.
4 Numerical implementation of the model
To implement the model numerically, we proceed as in AABH. We consider a long but
finite horizon (300 years) and let a single period consist of 10 years.13 The base period
(t = 0) is 1997–2006. The final period (T = 30) is 2297–2306.
We calibrate the model by assuming that in period 0 (the base period) there is
no environmental policy. Under this assumption, and using the values for world pri-
mary energy production by carrier, we solve for the base period technology efficiency
12In a decentralized equilibrium, this would translate into a high price and/or market size effect for
CCS.
13AABH take a period to be five years. Because our model has two extra sequences of decision
variables (Yat and sat, t = 1...300), we double the number of years per period to keep the total number
of decision variables in the numerical optimization within limits.
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parameters Ad0 and Ac0, as well as their weighted average B0
def
=
(
A−ϕc0 + A
−ϕ
d0
)− 1
ϕ (with
ϕ
def
= (1−ε)(1−α)) (see the Appendix): Ad0 = 2658, Ac0 = 1072, and B0 = 3232. Then,
using the result that MCj0 =
(
B0
Aj0
)1−α
(cf. (21) in the Appendix), we obtain:
MCd0 = 1.14
UON
QBTU and MCc0 = 2.09
UON
QBTU ,
where UON stands for units of the numeraire and QBTU are quadrillions (1015) of
British Thermal Units.
To convert the value of the numeraire to $ (USD), we take a weighted average of the
price of fossil fuels in the base period (EAI (2008), Table 3.1):14
3.314 $
million BTU = 3.314× 109 $QBTU .
Hence, our numeraire is worth 3.314
1.14
× 109$ = 2.907 × 109$. World carbon dioxide
emissions from energy consumption during the base period were 272040(2 × 136020)
million tons (EIA (2008), Table 11.19). As Yd0 = 3786(= 2 × 1893) QBTU, this means
an emission rate of
272040
3786
million ton CO2
QBTU
= 71.85million ton CO2
QBTU
.
A wide variety of estimates exist for the average cost of CCS, each surrounded by
a wide confidence interval. For example, the IEA provides estimates of 55$/ton CO2
for a pulverized coal power plant with CO2 capture and 80$/ton CO2 if a natural gas
combined cycle is used as a reference (Finkenrath (2011)).15 As a reference point, we
assume a constant marginal cost of 60$/ton CO2, but carry out a sensitivity analysis
across a wide range. Hence, the reference cost of abating CO2 when producing one
QBTU of dirty energy is:
60 $
ton CO2
× 71.85million ton CO2
QBTU
= 4.311× 109 $
QBTU
.
14Given 1 QBTU= 290× 109kWh, the average fossil fuel price amounts to 3.314290 $kWh = .0114 $kWh .
15Golombek et al. (2011), making use of the cost parameter estimates reported in IIPC (2005), obtain
the following estimates after correcting for differences in fuel costs, the rate of return on capital, and the
base year: coal greenfield pre-combustion: 35.6$/tCO2; gas greenfield post-combustion: 67.4$/tCO2;
coal retrofit post-combustion: 73.9$/tCO2; gas retrofit post-combustion: 116.6$/tCO2.
13
To express this cost in units of the numeraire, we divide by the earlier obtained rate
2.907× 109 $
UON
:
MCa0 = 1.483
UON
QBTU
.
Thus, in the base period, the reference CCS abatement cost amounts to about 130% of
the production cost of dirty energy.
Having found MCa0, we calibrate Aa0 using the relationship MCa =
(
B0
Aa0
)1−α
(cf.
(21) in the Appendix):
Aa0 =
B0
(1.483)
3
2
= 1789.6.
The quality of the environment, F˜ (St), is modelled as a decreasing and concave
function of the rise in temperature since pre-industrial times: F˜ (St) = F (∆t(St)), where
F (∆t) =
(∆tdis −∆t)λ − λ∆tλ−1dis (∆tdis −∆t)
(1− λ)∆tλdis
.
Here, ∆tdis is the increase in temperature leading to environmental disaster (taken at
6oC), and λ = 0.1442 (see AABH, 2012). This function has the property that F (0) = 1
and F (6) = 0, so that F (∆t) is an index of environmental quality (see solid line in
the Figure 1). A λ-value of .1442 amounts to a 1% reduction in environmental quality
following a 2oC Celsius temperature increase. Given this may be considered to be too
optimistic, we also consider a λ-value of .3011, which produces 2% damage at the same
temperature increase (cf. Weitzman (2010); see the dashed line in Figure 1).
The rise in temperature is a decreasing function of the carbon sink in the atmosphere,
St:
∆t = 3 log(
280× 2∆tdis3 − St
280
)/ log(2),
where 280 refers to the atmospheric concentration of CO2, measured in ppm (particles
per million by volume) since pre-industrial times, and δ is the regeneration rate of the
environment (set at 50% of emissions in the base period), i.e. δ = 1
2
emissions0
S0
= .0236
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Figure 1: Damage Function
(= 2× .0118).
As above, the emission rate for the base period was estimated at 71.85million ton CO2
QBTU
.
As 7.78 billion tons of emitted CO2 give rise to an increase in atmospheric concentration
of CO2 of one ppm, the emission rate as ppm per QBTU is:
ξ = 71.85million ton CO2
QBTU
× 1
7.78billion ton CO2
ppm
= .0092 ppm
QBTU
.
S0 is set at 741 ppm (cf. AABH, 2012). The utility function is assumed to take Cobb–
Douglas form U(c, F ) = [c·F ]
1−σ
1−σ , with σ = 2. However, the use of this particular utility
function has been criticized, as it allows for the too easy substitution of consumption
for environmental quality (Weitzman, 2010). We also ran simulations using a CES
utility function with a substitution elasticity of 1
2
(cf. Sterner and Persson (2008)):
U(c, F ) = 1
1−σ
(
[1
2
c
θ−1
θ + 1
2
F
θ−1
θ ]
θ
θ−1
)1−σ
with σ = 2 and θ = 1
2
. However, this does not
change the qualitative nature of our results (cf. Figure 5 below).
Finally, we follow AABH (and Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2004)) by setting the
elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty energy carriers in energy production
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ε = 3 and assuming a discount factor of 0.015 (such that β = .98522). The technological
progress parameters are chosen as follows: γ = 1, and ηc = ηd = ηa = .22 per 10-year
period (i.e., 2% per year). We also carry out a sensitivity analysis by assuming a 3%
per year probability of succesful research in the renewable energy and CCS sectors (the
”infant” sectors) for the first 50 years. This concludes the calibration of our model.
5 Results
We first present the results for MCa = 1.47 (corresponding to 60
$
ton CO2
avoided) when
preferences are of Cobb–Douglas form and λ = .1442. The results are presented in Figure
2. Panel b shows the time path for the optimal tax rate τt as well as the cost of CCS
relative to the marginal cost of dirty energy. Since MCat
MCdt
(
= pˆat
pˆdt
)
always exceeds τt, it
is never optimal to have the capture and storage of CO2 emissions (panel d). Because
CCS is never active, there are no scientists allocated to CCS R&D (panel a). Note that
the initial R&D activity on “dirty” energy carriers increases the cost of CCS relative to
that of Yd. These trajectories are identical to those depicted in Figure 1 in AABH. In
particular, after about 50 years, scientists are relocated from the dirty energy sector in
favour of the clean energy sector. Together with the tax on dirty energy, the result is a
gradual increase in the intensity of clean energy in final good production (panel e). The
temperature continues to increase but stabilizes below the disaster level of a temperature
rise of 60C. If λ is increased to 0.3011, although deteriorating the environmental impact
of a (smaller-than-disaster-level) temperature rise, the overall picture remains almost the
same, except that the switch from “clean” to “dirty” R&D takes place a few years earlier.
The result is a slightly lower temperature increase to which the climate converges.
–Figure 2a-f here–
As the current estimates for the marginal cost of CCS make neither CCS nor R&D
on CCS part of the optimal policy portfolio, we ask by how much this marginal cost
must fall before CCS and/or R&D on CCS start to be desirable. When MCa = .55
(corresponding approximately to 22$/tCO2 avoided, i.e., slightly above
1
3
of today’s (op-
timistic) reference level), CCS becomes optimal 200 years later. The reason is the steady
increase in the tax rate on Yd, passing the relative cost of abatement around t = 220.
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From then on, CCS becomes active, but not for long as the use of the dirty input be-
comes quite minimal. See Figure 3 for details. However, the fact that CCS is only active
in the distant future makes it suboptimal to divert any R&D resources to that sector in
the near future. We categorize these scenarios—without any R&D on CCS, but possibly
with active CCS in the distant future—under Regime 1. Our simulations show that
Regime 1 continues to hold for MCa values as low as 0.31, which corresponds to a CCS
cost as low as 12$/tCO2 avoided.
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–Figure 3a-f here–
For lower MCa values, a second regime, Regime 2, becomes optimal. We illustrate
this regime in Figure 4 under the assumption that MCa = .27 (i.e., 11$/tCO2). In this
regime, CCS becomes active after 50 years, i.e., sooner than in Regime 1 (see panel d).
The second difference w.r.t. Regime 1 is that R&D in CCS now becomes part of the
optimal research policy (see panel a). Whereas in Regime 1 only clean R&D prevails
in the distant future, there is no role at all in Regime 2 for “clean” R&D. Conversely,
“dirty” R&D dominates for about 100 years, after which the scientists are shared with
the CCS sector.17
–Figure 4a-f here–
In panel a in Figure 5 we have plotted the maximal intertemporal welfare against
values for MCa0. Recall that MCa0 = .25(2.5) corresponds to a marginal cost of about
10(100)$/tCO2. The maximal value function is drawn for the scenario described above
(CD preferences, λ = .1442) but also for the case of CES preferences and λ = .3011. For
all scenarios, we discern the same pattern: Regime 1 for modest to high CCS marginal
cost values and Regime 2 for very low values. In panel b, we draw the same maximal
value functions, but now for a disaster temperature increase of 5oC (i.e., ∆tdis = 5)
instead of 6oC. The simulations upon which these maximal value functions are based all
display the same qualitative features as the simulations reported in Figures 3 and 4.
16At MCa = 12.5$/tCO2 avoided, CCS becomes active after 70 years and activity increases to as high
as 100% around t = 220, after which it begins to decline. These high CCS rates do not necessarily
imply a growth in the absolute amounts captured and stored. The reason is the diminishing use of the
dirty energy carriers in Regime 1.
17The switch from Regime 1 to Regime 2 when MCa drops below some critical value in [.27, .31] (i.e.
[11$/tCO2, 12$/tCO2]) points to a non-convexity in the model owing to the endogenous nature of R&D
activity.
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–Figure 5a-b here–
In all of the above scenarios, the temperature increases above the critical value of 2oC,
and one may wonder whether penalizing temperature rises more heavily could “rescue”
CCS as a viable environmental policy instrument. For this reason, we also ran the
model under the assumption that environmental disasters are caused by 3oC or 4oC rises
in the temperature. The implications for lower ∆tdis values are substantial decreases
in CCS activity and resources dedicated to its R&D in case of Regime 2, or even the
disappearance of this regime altogether. For example, when MCa = 11$/tCO2, Regime
2 is unattainable when a disaster occurs with a 4oC increase in temperature. See Figure
6. The solution is Regime 1, with more resources now devoted to the non-fossil fuel
energy R&D (panel a). Moreover, the CCS sector, which once became active after 50
years in Regime 2, now becomes operative only after 130 years and is short-lived owing
to the strongly declining use of dirty energy carriers. Another implication is a lower
optimal trajectory for the tax rate on Yd, which is an outcome of a strong bias towards
non-fossil fuel energy use and the earlier devotion of resources to related R&D activities.
–Figure 6a-f here–
When ∆tdis = 3
oC, all scientific activity is diverted to the clean sector after 10 years.
See Figure 7 (panel a). The share of fossil fuels in the energy mix contracts more sharply
and the CCS sector becomes completely idle from the start (see panels d and e). An
earlier switch to clean R&D and non-fossil fuel carriers results in an even lower optimal
tax trajectory (panel b).
–Figure 7a-f here–
One may object to the assumption that all three sectors share the same rate of
success in innovation. In comparison to mature technologies, such as the fossil fuel
energy technology, technologies that are in their early stages of development, e.g. the
renewable energy and the CCS technologies, may be expected to display higher rates
of successful research. To test the implications of such a differentiation, we assumed
that the rate of success in innovation in the latter two sectors exceeds temporarily (50
years) the rate in the former sector with 1% (ηc = ηa = .03, ηd = .02). Figure 8 shows
the results for the ’critical’ MCa value of 11$/tCO2. Compared with Figure 4, we see
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that Regime 2 is replaced by Regime 1: even though research on CCS technology is
potentially more successful, the facts that CCS activity is complementary to the dirty
energy production and the latter cannot grow at the same rate reduce the scope for
CCS. As a consequence, it becomes optimal to fully allocate the researchers to the clean
sector in the long run (despite a short reallocation after 50 years, when all three research
sectors face the same potential rate of successful innovation again).
–Figure 8a-f here–
6 Conclusion
In recent decades, carbon capture and storage has been considered as a promising strat-
egy to curb CO2 emissions and therefore to address the problem of global warming.
Given the infancy of CCS technology, and the need for further research, development
and demonstration, it is desirable to assess the optimality of this strategy not only on
the basis of its current marginal cost, but also on the potential for improvements in cost
efficiencies following R&D efforts in dirty energy, clean energy, and CCS sectors.
For this purpose, we utilized the directed technical change model of Acemoglu et al.
(2012) by adding a sector responsible for CCS. Assuming that CCS competes for the
same R&D resources as the fossil fuel and renewable energy sectors, and that neither
sector has any comparative advantage in transforming R&D into technological improve-
ments, we have computed the Pareto–efficient time paths for production and research
activity in each sector.
Surprisingly, we found that even for very optimistic estimates for the current marginal
cost of CCS (60$/tCO2), it is not optimal in either the near or the distant future to
deploy this abatement technology and dedicate research efforts to it. It is only when we
consider current marginal costs less than 20% of the optimistic reference level, that a
regime with CCS and R&D of CCS technology becomes optimal, but even then not in
the near future. We also observed that a more stringent environmental constraint (in
the form of lower disaster temperature rise) limited the scope for the CCS sector and
the corresponding R&D activity.
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The stylized model we worked with can be extended in several directions. One
dimension is related to the dirty energy carrier, which we assumed to be constrained by
the amount of labour and capital devoted to transforming it into energy. Accordingly,
we could have introduced a finite fossil fuel resource. However, as CCS depends on
fossil fuel use, this will increase neither the scope for CCS nor the R&D devoted to this
technology. Similarly, less favourable conditions for CCS (such as technically feasible
capture rates below 100%, limited storage possibilities, and the risk of CO2 leakage),
while making the model more realistic, would only reduce the scope for this form of
abatement activity and its technology. Conversely, in our model renewable energy is
being produced under rather optimistic circumstances, as we have assumed away any
problems of intermittency and related problems regarding energy storage. An interesting
avenue for future research would be to evaluate the scope for CCS when such favourable
conditions are absent.
One can also conjecture that if one energy carrier is or becomes dominant, the ease
of substitution with alternative carriers would be reduced. This suggests an inverse-
U-shaped relationship between the intensity of, say, fossil fuels, and the elasticity of
substitution between fossil fuels and renewable energy (cf. footnote 9 and Gerlagh and
Lise (2005, pp. 249)). As it will become more difficult to substitute away from dirty
energy when this carrier is dominant, we expect that this would favour the role for CCS
in our model. The exploration of these issues is left for future research.
Lastly, we have confined ourselves to search for the first-best policies. With a suffi-
ciently broad set of instruments, these policies should be decentralizable even in imper-
fect market economies. Some imperfections, though, may be expected to have significant
consequences for the results. Hoel and Jensen (2012) recently showed that if policy mak-
ers can at best commit to a future climate policy while failing to agree on adoption of a
current policy, the reaction of fossil fuel owners (to advance the extraction of fossil fuels
in time) may make it more desirable to aim at a faster technical progress in abatement
rather than in renewable energy production. The consequences of such restrictions for
our model would be worthwhile investigating.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Solution of the model
The Lagrangian function for the planning problem is:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βtWt,
where
Wt = U(Yt − ψ
( ∑
j=a,c,d
xjt
)
, F˜ (St))
+λt
[(
Y
−1

ct + Y
−1

dt
) 
−1 − Yt
]
+
∑
j=a,c,d
λjt
[
L1−αjt A
1−α
jt x
α
jt − Yjt
]
+wt
[
1−
∑
j=a,c,d
Ljt
]
+ vt
[
1−
∑
j=a,c,d
sjt
]
+
∑
j=a,c,d
µjt [(1 + γηjsjt)Ajt−1 − Ajt]
+ωt [−ξ (Ydt−1 − Yat−1) + (1 + δ)St−1 − St] + φt [Ydt − Yat] .
Thus Wt is the undiscounted period t welfare, λt is the social value of final production
in period t, wt(vt) is the shadow value of labour (research) in period t, µjt is the social
value of productivity in sector j in period t, and ωt is the social value of the environment
in period t. When writing the quality index of the environment as a function of the stock
of CO2, we have subsumed the relationship through the increase in temperature, ∆t.
The first-order condition (FOC) w.r.t. Yt shows that λt = Uct. The FOC w.r.t. St
shows that UstF˜
′
t = ωt − (1 + δ)βωt+1. This is a forward-looking equation that can be
solved for ωt, the social value of a one unit improvement of the environment in t, as:
ωt =
∞∑
k=0
βk(1 + δ)kUskF˜
′
k.
Improving the environment today thus generates a stream of future benefits.
We now solve for the remaining decision variables. First, note that because of the CES
specification, both the clean and dirty inputs will be used in strictly positive quantities.
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For the clean input, we obtain the optimality condition:
MPct = p̂ct
def
=
λct
λt
, (6)
i.e., the equality of its marginal product, MPct, with its social price. A similar condition
holds for the dirty input, corrected for the environmental externality:
MPdt = p̂dt + ξβ
ωt+1
λt
− φt
λt
, (7)
where p̂dt
def
= λct
λt
, the social price of the dirty input. The term ξβ ωt+1
λt
is equivalent to a
tax on the use of the dirty input in a decentralized solution. It ensures a more moderate
use of the dirty input than the equality of MPdt with p̂dt would call for. The extra term
φt
λt
is due to abatement. Before interpreting it, we give the FOC w.r.t. Yat:
−λat + βωt+1 − φt ≤ 0,
with equality when Yat > 0. Dividing through by λt and defining p̂at
def
= λat
λt
, we can
write this as:
p̂at ≥ ξβωt+1
λt
− φt
λt
.
If any abatement is suboptimal, Yat = 0 < Ydt, and p̂at ≥ ξβ ωt+1λt ; the social marginal
cost of abatement is too high compared with its social marginal benefit. However,
suppose that abatement is optimal, then either there is partial abatement, 0 < Yat ≤
Ydt, in which case p̂at = ξβ
ωt+1
λt
, or there is full abatement, Yat = Ydt, in which case
p̂at ≤ ξβ ωt+1λt . In this last case, the social marginal benefit is larger than the social
marginal cost, but the welfare programme is constrained by the fact that abatement can
only apply to contemporaneous emissions, not to CO2 emitted in previous periods (i.e.,
it is not possible to remove previously emitted CO2 from the atmosphere). If this is the
case, then social welfare may be increased by expanding dirty input production beyond
the level where MPdt = p̂dt + ξβ
ωt+1
λt
. Indeed, then:
MPdt = p̂dt + p̂at. (8)
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CO2 abatement is merely an additional social cost. Thus, we can conclude that:
MPdt = p̂dt + min{p̂at, ξβωt+1
λt
}, (9)
= p̂dt + min{p̂at, τ vt p̂dt}, (10)
where τ vt
def
= ξβ ωt+1
λt
1
p̂dt
, i.e., the ad valorem rate that internalizes the externality.
Having determined the optimality conditions for Yjt, we now consider the use of
labour and physical capital. Both inputs are required in positive amounts. For labour,
the value of the marginal product of labour in the production of sector j must equal the
social wage rate ŵt
def
= wt
λt
:
p̂jtMPLjt = ŵt, or (11)
(1− α)p̂jtA1−αjt
(
xjt
Ljt
)α
= ŵt. (12)
Likewise, for machines:
p̂jtMPxjt = ψ, or (13)
αp̂jtA
1−α
jt
(
Ljt
xjt
)1−α
= ψ, (14)
where ψ is the (exogenously given) amount of final goods necessary to build one machine.
Finally, we determine the allocation of scientists, and the production of knowledge.
The FOC w.r.t. sjt is:
µjt
λt
γηjAjt−1 ≤ v̂t def= vt
λt
,
with equality whenever sjt > 0. The left-hand side (LHS) is the social price of sector
j knowledge,
µjt
λt
, times the marginal knowledge production of an additional researcher.
The RHS is the social wage rate of a researcher.
The final set of FOCs characterizes the allocation of productivity improvements in
the different sectors across time. The FOC w.r.t. Ajt reads:
p̂jt(1− α)L1−αjt
(
xjt
Ajt
)α
=
µjt
λt
− βµjt+1
λt+1
λt+1
λt
(1 + γηjsjt+1).
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The LHS is the value of the marginal product of newly acquired knowledge on the
use of machines. Using (14), an optimal allocation of knowledge implies that the social
price of sector j knowledge,
µjt
λt
, must evolve according to the rule:
(1− α)
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α
Ljtp̂
1
1−α
jt =
µjt
λt
− βµjt+1
λt+1
λt+1
λt
(1 + γηjsjt+1).
Multiplying through by λtAjt and making use of Ajt+1 = (1 + γηjsjt)Ajt give:
µjtAjt = (1− α)
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α
Ljtλtp̂
1
1−α
jt Ajt + βµjt+1Ajt+1.
The social value of acquired knowledge in sector j at time t is the value of Ajt priced
at its marginal product plus the “standing on the shoulder of giants” effect (future
knowledge builds on today’s knowledge). Using the forward operator F , multiplying
through by γηj
Ajt−1
Ajt
and making use of Ajt = (1 + γηjsjt+1)Ajt−1 result in:
µjt
λt
γηjAjt−1 =
1
λt
γηj
1 + γηjsjt+1
1
1− βF (1− α)
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α
Ljtλtp̂
1
1−α
jt Ajt, (15)
=
1
λt
γηj
1 + γηjsjt+1
(1− α)
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α ∞∑
τ=0
βτLjt+τλt+τ p̂
1
1−α
jt Ajt+τ ,
so that the social value of allocating an extra researcher to sector j is given by the
discounted sum of future knowledge levels, appropriately valued and weighted.
Solving (14) for xjt gives:
xjt =
(
α
p̂jt
ψ
) 1
1−α
AjtLjt, (16)
which can be plugged into (12) to yield the social price of sector j output, as a weighted
average of the exogenous machine price, ψ, and the shadow price of labour, ŵjt:
p̂jt =
1
A
1
A1−αjt
ŵ1−αt ψ
α, (17)
where A def= αα(1− α)1−α. Hence, at an optimum, p̂jt will equal the social marginal cost
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of sector j output.
Next, the FOCs for Yct and Ydt can be used to relate these input levels to aggregate
output, Yt and the shadow prices of the inputs:
Yct = Ytp̂
−ε
ct (18)
Ydt = Yt [p̂dt + min{p̂at, τ vt p̂dt}]−ε
= Ytp̂
−ε
dt
[
1 + min{ p̂at
p̂dt
, τ vt }
]−ε
= Ytp̂
−ε
dt
[
1 + min{
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α
, τ vt }
]−ε
, (19)
where the last equality follows from (17). Making use of the final good production func-
tion, we obtain:
1 = p̂1−εct + p̂
1−ε
dt
[
1 + min{
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α
, τ vt }
]1−ε
.
As p̂jt (j = c, d, a) are given by (17):
1 =
1
A1−ε ŵ
ϕ
t ψ
α(1−ε)
A−ϕct + A−ϕdt
[
1 + min{
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α
, τ vt }
]1−ε ,
where ϕ
def
= (1− α) (1− ε).
Hence, we can solve for the social value of the wage rate:
ŵt = A 11−αψ− α1−α
A−ϕct + A−ϕdt
[
1 + min{
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α
, τ vt }
]1−ε−ϕ
= A 11−αψ− α1−αBt, (20)
thereby implicitly defining the “sector average” productivity parameter Bt as:
Bt
def
=
A−ϕct + A−ϕdt
[
1 + min{
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α
, τ vt }
]1−ε− 1ϕ .
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From (20) and (17), the social prices of the two inputs as well as the price of abatement
are then:
p̂jt =
(
Bt
Ajt
)1−α
(j = c, d, a). (21)
Machine use in sector j can be obtained from (16) and (21):
xjt = p̂
1
1−α
jt
(
α
ψ
) 1
1−α
AjtLjt =
(
α
ψ
) 1
1−α
BtLjt, (22)
and therefore the aggregate machine cost (the share of final good production used for
capital) is:
AMCt
def
=
∑
j=c,d,a
ψxjt = ψ
(
α
ψ
) 1
1−α
Bt
∑
j=c,d,a
Ljt = ψ
− α
1−αα
1
1−αBt, (23)
where the last equality follows from the normalization of the labour supply to one.
To find the levels of production in the three sectors, we plug the solution for xjt (22)
into the production function, yielding:
Yjt = AjtLjt
(
α
p̂jt
ψ
) α
1−α
=
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α
LjtA
1−α
jt B
α
t (j = c, d, a).
Therefore Ljt =
(
α
ψ
)− α
1−α
Aα−1jt B
−α
t Yjt, which allows us to write (15) as:
µjt
λt
γηjAjt−1 =
1
λt
γηj
1 + γηjsjt+1
(1− α)
∞∑
τ=0
βτAαjt+τB
−α
t+τYjtλt+τ p̂
1
1−α
jt
=
1
λt
γηj
1 + γηjsjt+1
(1− α)
∞∑
τ=0
βτλt+τ p̂jtYjt,
where the second equality follows from (21). This is expression (5) in the text.
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On the other hand, (18) and (19) together with (21) give:
Yct = Yt
(
Bt
Act
)−ε(1−α)
, and
Ydt = Yt
(
Bt
Adt
)−ε(1−α) [
1 + min{
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α
, τ vt }
]−ε
.
The last three expressions now allow us to write the labour balance equation as:{
A−ϕct B
−(1−ϕ)
t Yt + A
−ϕ
dt B
−(1−ϕ)
t
[
1 + min{
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α
, τ vt }
]−ε
Yt
+YatA
−(1−α)
at B
−α
t
}
=
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α
. (24)
We now look at the three possibilities. The first is where there is full abatement,
Yat = Ydt, such that min{
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α
, τ vt } =
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α
. In that case:
Yat = Ydt = Yt
(
Bt
Adt
)−ε(1−α) [
1 +
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α]−ε
.
Making use of these values for Yat and Ydt in the labour balance equation (24) reduces
the latter to:(
α
ψ
)− α
1−α
B
−(1−ϕ)
t B
−ϕ
t Yt = 1,
so that
Y FAt =
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α
Bt,
Y FAct =
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α
Bϕ+αt A
1−(ϕ+α)
ct ,
Y FAdt =
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α
Bϕ+αt A
1−(ϕ+α)
dt
[
1 +
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α]−ε
, and
Y FAat = Y
FA
dt .
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In the second case, there is partial abatement such that 0 < Yat < Ydt and min{
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α
, τ vt } =(
Adt
Aat
)1−α
= τ vt . Now (24) becomes:
{
A−ϕct B
−(1−ϕ)
t Yt + A
−ϕ
dt B
−(1−ϕ)
t [1 + τ
v
t ]
−ε Yt + YatA
−(1−α)
at B
−α
t
}
=
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α
,
yielding:
Y PAt =
{(
α
ψ
) α
1−α
− YatA−(1−α)at B−αt
}
B1−ϕt[
A−ϕct + A
−ϕ
dt [1 + τ
v
t ]
−ε] , (25)
Y PAct = Y
PA
t
(
Bt
Act
)−ε(1−α)
, (26)
Y PAdt = Y
PA
t
(
Bt
Adt
)−ε(1−α) [
1 +
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α]−ε
. (27)
For this to be compatible with partial abatement, we need Yat ≤ Y PAdt , which can be
shown to be equivalent with:
Yat ≤
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α A
ε(1−α)
dt B
α
t [1 + τ
v
t ]
−ε{
A−ϕct + A
−ϕ
dt [1 + τ
v
t ]
−ε
(
1 +
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α)} . (28)
Given partial abatement is optimal, we have
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α
= τ vt , and this condition
reduces to:
Yat ≤
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α A
ε(1−α)
dt B
1−ε(1−α)
t[
1 +
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α]ε . (29)
In the third case, there is no abatement: Yat = 0 and min{
(
Adt
Aat
)1−α
, τ vt } = τ vt . The
equilibrium value for Yt is then found by setting Yat = 0 in (25):
Y NAt =
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α B1−ϕt[
A−ϕct + A
−ϕ
dt [1 + τ
v
t ]
−ε] ,
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and
Y NAct =
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α Bαt A
ε(1−α)
ct[
A−ϕct + A
−ϕ
dt [1 + τ
v
t ]
−ε] ,
Y NAdt =
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α Bαt A
ε(1−α)
dt[
A−ϕct + A
−ϕ
dt [1 + τ
v
t ]
−ε] [1 + τ vt }]−ε , and
Y NAat = 0.
When solving the model, we search for a sequence {τ vt , sct, sdt, Yat}Tt=0 (where T is
large) that maximizes:
T∑
t=0
βtU(Y PAt (Yat)− AMCt, F˜ ((1 + δ)St−1 − ξ (Ydt−1 − Yat−1))),
subject to the equality constraints (23), (26), (27), sat = 1−sct−sdt, Ajt = (1 + γηjsjt)Ajt−1
(all t and j), the non-linear inequality constraint (28), and with the initial productivity
levels Aj0 given.
7.2 Calibration of the model
Without any policy intervention in the base period, the laissez-faire levels for clean and
dirty input production are:
Yc0 =
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α Bα0A
−ε(1−α)
c0
A−ϕc0 + A
−ϕ
d0
, and Ydt =
(
α
ψ
) α
1−α Bα0A
−ε(1−α)
d0
A−ϕc0 + A
−ϕ
d0
,
where B0
def
=
(
A−ϕc0 + A
−ϕ
d0
)− 1
ϕ , and ϕ
def
= (1 − ε)(1 − α). This system can be solved for
Ac0 and Ad0:
Ad0 =
(
α
ψ
)− α
1−α
Yd0
[
1 +
(
Yd0
Yc0
) 1−ε
ε
]α+ϕ
ϕ
,
Ac0 =
(
α
ψ
)− α
1−α
Yc0
[
1 +
(
Yc0
Yd0
) 1−ε
ε
]α+ϕ
ϕ
.
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As in AABH, we have used the values for world primary energy production by energy
carrier during the period 2002–2006 (EAI (2008), Table 11.1) and doubled them. Dirty
carriers (coal, natural gas, crude oil, and natural gas plant liquids) yield 3786 QBTU,
while clean carriers (nuclear electric power, hydroelectric power, geothermal, and others)
provide 615 QBTU.18 Under the assumptions that α = 1
3
, ε = 3 (and therefore ϕ = −4
3
),
and the normalization ψ = α2, we obtain the following estimates for Ad0, Ac0, and B0:
Ad0 = 2658, Ac0 = 1072, and B0 = 3232.
18The corresponding values for 2002–2006, adopted by AABH were 1893.25 and 307.77, respectively.
33
Cobb−Douglas Preferences, MCa=60$/tCO2, lambda=.1442
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Cobb−Douglas Preferences, MCa=22$/tCO2, lambda=.1442
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Cobb−Douglas Preferences, MCa=11$/tCO2, lambda=.1442
0 50 100 150 200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
a) 
Fra
ctio
n o
f S
cie
ntis
ts
 
 
0 50 100 150 200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
t
b) 
Ta
x(%
) a
nd
 Pa
/Pd
 
 
0 50 100 150 200
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
t
c) 
Te
mp
era
tur
e(°
C)
 
 
0 50 100 150 200
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
t
d) 
CC
S (
%)
 
 
0 50 100 150 200
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
t
e) 
Cle
an
 inp
ut 
− O
utp
ut 
Ra
tio
 
 
0 50 100 150 200
−3
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
x 10−4
t
f) U
tilit
y
 
 
sc
sd
sa
Tax(%)
Pa/Pd
temp
CCS(%)
Yc/Y
Utility
Figure 4
36
Welfare Analysis
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Figure 5: Maximal intertemporal welfare levels against values for MCa0
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Cobb−Douglas Preferences, MCa=11$/tCO2, lambda=.1442, DisTemp=4
0 50 100 150 200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
a) 
Fra
ctio
n o
f S
cie
ntis
ts
 
 
0 50 100 150 200
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
t
b) 
Ta
x(%
) a
nd
 Pa
/Pd
 
 
0 50 100 150 200
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
t
c) 
Te
mp
era
tur
e(°
C)
 
 
0 50 100 150 200
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
t
d) 
CC
S (
%)
 
 
0 50 100 150 200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
e) 
Cle
an
 inp
ut 
− O
utp
ut 
Ra
tio
 
 
0 50 100 150 200
−3
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
x 10−4
t
f) U
tilit
y
 
 
sc
sd
sa
Tax(%)
Pa/Pd
temp
CCS(%)
Yc/Y
Utility
Figure 6
38
Cobb−Douglas Preferences, MCa=11$/tCO2, lambda=.1442, DisTemp=3
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Cobb−Douglas Preferences, MC
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